SYMBOLS USED FOR URDU

ڑ	ʈ	Ŗ	ɾ
ڑھ	ʈh	Ŗh	ɾh
ڈ	ḍ	Ḍ	ḍ
ڈھ	ḍh	Ḍh	ḍh
ت	ṭ	T	ṭ
تھ	ṭh	Ṭh	ṭh
ٹھ	th	Th	

/ē/as in Urdu/pēt/=stomach or /lōg/ = people.
/ẽ/ nasalised).

1

Introduction

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 (popularly referred to as 9/11), the term 'jihad' has become a household word. After every attack on targets in the Western world, be it the underground of London, Madrid, or Paris, or the 2016 March attacks in Brussels, Muslims, as well as people in the West who want good relations with them, insist that jihad means the quest for moral improvement and that, if one kind of jihad (the lesser one) does mean fighting, it is only in self-defence which is an internationally recognised right of all nations and peoples. Their antagonists dismiss these claims, arguing that jihad in practice as well as theory actually refers to aggressive warfare against non-Muslims. Among Muslims too, in an ironic twist, there are supporters of that argument. Indeed, Islamist militants have written tracts calling for unending war against the West (whom they call 'crusaders') and their supporters, i.e. rulers of Muslim countries. These are no mere theoretical concerns; these are matters of life and death. Hence, not only out of intellectual curiosity but also for practical reasons of policy-making, it is imperative that the interpretations of jihad should be understood for the world as a whole and, particularly, for flashpoints in it. And one of these flashpoints, incidentally one in which the author happens to live, is Pakistan. Pakistan has been at the centre of violent *jihādī* activities for more than a decade. Afghanistan has been fighting a series of wars, which have been called jihad, for thirty years, and India has been the brunt of attacks by groups claiming to be *jihādī* in the last few years.

Giving precise definitions of the various interpretations of Islam is a difficult undertaking. However, some guidelines for the usage of terms which will appear in this work are necessary. Here the term *radical Islamists* is used for people or groups who believe it is justified to use violence to create an Islamic state or fight 'Western' powers which, in their perception, exploit Muslims or prevent Islam from gaining political ascendancy over the world. The terms *jihādīs* and *Islamist militants* are

used interchangeably for groups actually using violent means as opposed to merely approving of such use. Other studies, generally by political scientists, often use the term, Islamism, for the terms given above. Islamism is defined by Volpi in his introduction to 'political Islam' as 'the political dynamics generated by the activities of those people who believe that Islam as a body of faith has something crucial to say about how society should be organized, and who seek to implement this idea as a matter of priority'.[1] Political Islam may not always lead to violence but sometimes it does. Hence the need for precise terms such as the ones used above for groups choosing to apply their ideas to change the world by violence in the name of Islam. Other terms used at places in this study are *salafism* and Wahhābism (or Wahabism as it is called in the popular press). The first is based on following the way of life of the pious early Muslims. The second is based on the thought of the eighteenth century religious reformer Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (1703–91) who preached a return to 'original' Islam since innovations—like mysticism and asking for the intercession of saints or worshipping at their tombs—he said, were akin to idolatry. Those who interpret the canonical sources literally are often labelled in the press as *fundamentalists* but this usage is disputed by Muslims. Labels like *neo-fundamentalists* and *moderate Islamists* are also used in the literature but remain imprecise and will, therefore, be avoided in this study. It is, however, wise to remember that these categories are neither immutable nor hermetic.[2] Not only strict practitioners of the faith and radical Islamists shade into one another, but, in fact, all groups do. Indeed, it is true to say that 'actual Islamist groups do not necessarily fall neatly into either of these ideal-type categories'. Moreover, 'movements frequently change their identity over time, becoming more radicalized or more "mainstream"'.[3] But our interest is in the ideas of those who believe in initiating wars, attacks, and armed insurrections with reference to 'Islamic referents—terms, symbols and events taken from the Islamic tradition'.[4] And this is because some of this kind of thought has influenced Pakistan in recent years. While we are not concerned with finding the causes or cures of radical Islamist thought or militancy, we are interested in tracing out the intellectual history of this interpretation in South Asia. For the purposes of this study, the term South Asia refers primarily to the Urdu-using part of what used to be British India and is also called the Subcontinent. Urdu is used for formal writing of the works, mainly exegeses of the Qur'an that we shall be dealing with from the Khyber Pass in present-day Pakistan up to the urban areas of Bengal as well as in the former states of Hyderabad, Rampur, and Bhopal. However, while we

shall touch in passing upon the last three areas, our focus will be on the Muslim societies of north India and Pakistan. Essentially it boils down to the question of how jihad came to be interpreted in this manner. This is the central question of this book. But before answering this question let us give a brief introduction to what is available in the canonical sources, the Qur'an and the hadith (pl. *aḥadīth*), about war. Our major objective is to highlight interpretations of texts which are used by radical Islamists to justify their actions.

There are references to war and fighting in 183 verses of the Qur'an. The ones used for analysis in this book (given in Table 1.1) are given in English translation in Annexure B. The relevant gist of the other Qur'anic verses mentioned in the text is given parenthetically in the form of brief abstracts. The number given above varies in other counts because some verses which seem to describe historical events dealing with war or conflict are added by some while not by others. The word which is mostly used for warfare is *qitāl* (78 occurrences). It is derived from the root -*q.t.l*- which is translated both as fighting and killing. This number is disputed by others since, for instance, Asma Afsaruddin counts fifty-four 'lexemes from the third verbal form of the root *qtl*'.[5] The *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'an*, however, counts only forty-four occurrences from the -*qtl*-root.[6] This is mainly because one can count only lexemes relating to war as it relates to Islam and Muslims or to anyone. Moreover, one can count the occurrences of the lexemes in verses relating to fighting or all verses. I count words derived from the root -*q.t.l*- referring to all meanings of it: you fight/kill; you are fought with/killed; killing/fighting, and so on. However, words used from the same root in verses not relating to fighting have not been counted. The word jihad, from the root -*j.h.d*- which is translated as effort and endeavour[7] (27 occurrences), does not necessarily refer to fighting. Indeed, five occurrences of the word refer to oaths, leaving us with thirty-six. 'Only ten out of the thirty-six' references to jihad signify or are 'unequivocally interpreted as signifying warfare'.[8] Thus, there are instances when the term Jihad has been used for peaceful struggle in the Qur'an (see Annexure A). For instance, the following verse of *Sūrah al Furqān* (Q. 25) mentions only struggle (jihad) but not fighting (*qitāl*).

So do not believe in the infidels but 'undertake a Great Struggle against them' (*jāhidhum bihī jihādan kabīrā*) (25:52).

Here the imperative—as explained by most exegetes—is to struggle against the infidels with the Qur'an, which is called the 'great struggle' here.

However, at places it is clear that this struggle will involve the loss of both wealth and life. In such cases the words used are '*wa jahadū bi amwālihim wa anfusihim*' which means 'struggle with your wealth and selves' (9 instances). This has generally been interpreted traditionally as the kind of effort which involves donating one's wealth and enrolling among the fighters. Some of the verses using this word are obviously from a context of ongoing warfare. For instance, *al-Ṣaff* (Q. 61) instructs Muslims to 'strive for God with their wealth and lives' (61:11); *al-Tawbah* (Q. 9), which is about the war of Tabuk, mentions God's appreciation of those who leave their homes and 'struggle with their lives and wealth' (9:20). And 9:41, about the same war, begins with 'go forth heavy or light' (*infirū khifāfan wa thiqālan*), and goes on to advocate striving with lives and property (see Annexure A). Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988), an American academic scholar of Islam of Pakistani origin, points out that the term jihad changes meaning from Makkah to Madinah. In the former it refers to 'a strong-willed resistance to the pressures of *fitnah* and retaliation in case of violence'. In Madinah, however, 'it is often equivalent to *qitāl* or to active war'.[9] Besides, as Michael Bonner brings out, the words *ribāt, ghazwā*, and *harb* have also been used. *Ribāt* refers to the 'pious activity, often related to warfare' as well as a fortified garrison in the face of the enemy. '*Ghazw, ghazwa* and *ghaza*' come from offensive warfare or raids on the enemy; *harb* simply means war and not necessarily one fought for religious reasons.[10] So, out of the terms used for sacred war, the one normally used is that of jihad while it might more appropriately be *qitāl*. After all, as Patricia Crone points out, all classical schools of law do identify such war with reference to *al-Baqarah* (Q. 2)—'prescribed for you is fighting, though it be hateful to you' (2:216). Here the word used is *qitāl*, not jihad. Indeed, she continues, 'it is a bit of a mystery that jihad came to be the technical term for holy war'.[11]

Besides establishing the frequency of occurrence of derivatives of jihad and *qitāl*, the verses referring to war have been placed in separate categories in a chart given in Annexure A. These are: orders (for war as well as peace, exemption from war and so on); values (praise for the fighters), regulations (for distribution of booty etc.), history (the wars of the Jews under Moses, the battles of the Muslims with the Quraish), and prognostication (that of the domination of Muslims subject to their piety).[12]

The Islamist militants who are fighting today in Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan and India are Sunnis, not Shī'as (Shīites). Thus, we need to be concerned only with the Sunni interpretations of jihad for the purposes of this study. Although all Muslims consider the Qur'an and the hadith as the canonical sources of Islam, both are interpreted to yield discrepant meanings through hermeneutical methods which will be described in the following chapter.

Based on the two foundational sources mentioned above, there are books of jurisprudence which lay down recommended practices towards the treatment of prisoners of war, collection of poll tax (*jizyah*) from non-Muslims vanquished in war, and so on.[13] For instance, 'Ali ibn Ṭāhir al-Sulamī al-Naḥwī's *Kitāb aljihād* is meant to incite his listeners to undertake jihad as this was the period of the Crusades.[14] These traditional sources of law pertaining to jihad, and most importantly, treatises written on the subject in India, will be dealt with in detail in chapter 3.

Let us now turn to how jihad is understood in scholarly literature at present. Books upon books and articles upon articles have been written on this issue.[15] Having already referred to Bonner's comprehensive history of the evolution of jihad in history, let us look at another book of the same kind, namely Richard Bonney's comprehensive historical introduction to it. This book traces out how events called 'jihad' played out in modern history all over the world. The last section presents secondary sources aiming at rehabilitating Islam as a religion which can coexist with other belief-systems.[16] Reuven Firestone makes the point that there were several passages from the foundational texts which a given faction 'would refer to' for 'support of its views'. But then the transition from a pre-Islamic (tribal) worldview to an Islamic one occurred and ideological, rather than kinship-based, fighting emerged as the desiderated norm for sacred war.[17] Lewis blames the 'failure of modernity', by which he means bad living standards in the Muslim world, for the rise of radical Islamist thought. He then goes on to pin the blame on the Saudi 'Wahabi' ideology which 'offers a set of themes, slogans, and symbols that are profoundly familiar and therefore effective in mobilizing support and in formulating a critique of what is wrong and a program for putting it right.'[18] Cook explains the concept of jihad in the canonical sources of Islam—Qur'an, hadith, and *Fiqh* (body of law derived from the canonical sources of Islam. Jurisprudence)—concluding that during the first several centuries of Islam 'the interpretation of Jihad was unabashedly aggressive and expansive'.[19] Patricia Crone, in her magisterial work on political thought in medieval Islam, also points out that, among Sunnis at least, 'Muslims were legally

obliged to wage holy war against *dār al ḥarb* [the land of war] until it ceased to exist or the world came to an end'.[20] However, she also adds that Muslims were, in theory, supposed to fight only for faith and not for conquest or material gain. This, of course, did not really happen since the conquered people were not forced to convert to Islam. In other words, according to her, it was imperialism after all but one 'linked to a religious *mission civilisatrice* rather than the satisfaction of Arab chauvinism'.[21] This, she adds, was more like British and French 'white man's burden' theory rather than Charlemagne's 'forced conversion of the Saxons'.[22] But Crone's basic hypothesis is that, like other Near Eastern people, the Arabs 'understood their religion in a particularist vein' hence Arab imperialism came to be clothed in terms of ideological universalism. But this conclusion would be contested by Muslims as well as 'apologist' Western scholars.[23]

Kepel presents a history of modern Islam in the broad context of international relations and the rise and ultimate failure of fundamentalist Islam. His main argument is that terrorism is more a consequence of the failure of Islamists to take over any major state and establish their rule there. In short, it is a sign of defeat rather than triumph.[24] This is also Olivier Roy's argument, i.e. that political Islam 'has lost its original impetus'.[25] Others explain militant actions by individual leaders such as Osama bin Laden (1957–2011), or groups and organisations such as al-Qaeda or ISIS as political Islam, Islamism or Jihadism.[26] One of the early attempts at this kind of explanations is Jason Burke's *Al-Qaeda*.[27] His main argument is that there is a narrative about the sufferings of Muslims as a group from the aggressive and exploitative policies of the 'West', again taken as a hegemonic whole, which is supported by the rulers of Muslim countries who are stooges of the 'West'. Using religious vocabulary promoted by militant intellectuals, the 'West' is called the Crusader and the Muslim rulers who support Western policies are perceived as infidel oppressors for whom the word *tāghūt*—which has several meanings but which is normally used for a tyrant who rebels against God's laws—is used. Angry young rebels seeking an explanation for their own frustrations, resenting the lifestyle of their rulers, or exposed to the images of Muslims facing violence in Chechnya, Bosnia, Palestine, Kashmir, and Myanmar, find bin Laden's idea of a conspiracy against Muslims very convincing. Burke gives examples of Dīdār, a Kurdish would-be suicide bomber, who read 'Abdullāh Yūsuf 'Azzām's (1941–1989) works in a local mosque which made him feel that he should die for the cause of Islam.[28] Likewise, Al-Owhālī, a young Saudi, had also read

'Azzām and the militant magazine *al Jihād*, before he decided to offer his services to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Moreover, when in a training camp there, he kept on receiving *fatwās* (religious edicts: pl. *fatāwā*) which called for violence.[29] Siddique Khan, the British man of Pakistani origin who planned and carried out the London bombings, explained his violent actions with reference to a global war between Islam and the West in which 'violent resistance' is 'an obligation on all believers and "collateral damage" in the form of death of innocents is thus acceptable.'[30] This, as we shall see, is one of the major interpretations of jihad by Islamist militants. Bergen goes into details of al-Qaeda and its founder, Osama bin Laden, providing much useful data from his statements. And the historian Faisal Devji, again referring to international jihad, provides insights into the way ideas of jihad interact with the actions of organizations and individuals. John Kelsay's book, *Arguing the Just War in Islam*,[31] in keeping with its title, gives a history of what has been the intellectual pedigree of the 'just war' beginning with medieval jurists but giving most space to the Islamists and modern scholars, both Sunni and Shī'a, who argue that a legitimate response to the 'West' is the kind of asymmetrical war which the world is witnessing.[32]

Among modern Muslim authors there is, for instance, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (b. 1926) whose treatise on jihad in Arabic, *Fiqh al-jihād*, published in 2009, has been ably summarised in English in a book edited by the Tunisian scholar, Raschid al-Ghannoushi (Rāshid al-Ghannūshī) (b. 1941). Qaraḍāwī's book is important because of its wide circulation in the Muslim world. It is best summarised here in the form of the author's counter-arguments against the pro-jihad arguments of the radical Islamists. The latter use nine pro-jihad arguments summed up under five heads: (a) verses of the Qur'an from *al-Baqarah* (Q. 2) and *al-Anfal* (Q. 8), i.e. (2:193; 8:39) and, above all, the 'sword verse' (9:5) (the first two command Muslims to keep fighting till *fitnah* comes to an end and Islam is established, while the last one tells Muslims to kill the 'polytheists' wherever found [see Annexure B for texts]); (b) Hadith reports according to which the Prophet (PBUH) was sent with a sword and that he was to keep fighting till everyone converted to Islam (see Annexure C for texts); (c) that the wars of the Prophet (PBUH) and his Companions were offensive ones and not defensive ones; (d) that disbelief is sufficient reason for aggression; (e) that all political systems must be subjugated by Muslims to enable people to choose Islam freely.

Qaraḍāwī's counter-arguments are: (a) that *fitnah* is 'turning Muslims back from their religion', not 'disbelief', which is the reason for war,

so that the first two verses restrict fighting once Muslims are no longer persecuted, while for 9:5, it does not abrogate the peaceful verses but is itself specific to the Arab polytheists who no longer exist; (b) that the *aḥadīth* in question are weak and in conflict with the Qur'an; (c) that the Prophet (PBUH) never initiated hostilities against those who had entered into treaties with him (as for the Companions, they fought to protect the embryonic Islamic state through pre-emptive attacks or attacked tyrants to liberate their oppressed people) (d) notwithstanding the views of some medieval exegetes, there are many reasons for suggesting that disbelief is not the reason for war (e.g., the conquered people are allowed to retain their beliefs); (e) such views are only held by the Egyptian radical Islamist thinker Sayyid Quṭb (1906–1966) and the Pakistani revivalist scholar Abū'l A'lā Mawdūdī (1903–1979) but are obviously erroneous. As such arguments and counter-arguments are much in evidence in South Asia also, Qaraḍāwī is as relevant here as he is to the rest of the Muslim world.[33]

Qaraḍāwī distinguishes between a defensive jihad and one of choice (*jihād al-ṭalab*). In contrast to medieval jurists, he argues that the latter is not an obligation. Among other things, he offers a critique of the hermeneutical device of abrogation which allows the radical Islamists to write off the peaceful verses.[34] Among other things, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, an American Islamic scholar of Pakistani origin, points out that Qaraḍāwī takes the support of the medieval Islamic scholar Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymiyyah's (1263–1328) work called *Qā'idah mukhtaṣarah* which asserts that unbelievers are not to be fought with because of their beliefs but because they could be a danger to Muslims. This is significant since Ibn Taymiyyah is normally used by radical Islamists to argue just the opposite.[35]

Another Muslim author whose book on jihad is taken seriously is the Iraqi born American academic, Majīd Khaddūrī (1909–2007). Khaddūrī agrees with the classical theory that 'inherent in the state's action in waging a jihad is the establishment of Muslim sovereignty, since the supremacy of God's word carries necessarily with it God's political authority'.[36] In this he agrees with contemporary Islamist radicals but also differs from them in that he does not allow individuals to assume leadership in a holy war. This remains a function of the state and that too only for religious purposes. Moreover, while he believes that jihad is perpetual since there will always be unbelievers, this does not mean that there should be 'continuous fighting'. Indeed, when Muslim power

declined, jihad was 'no longer compatible with Muslim interests' and so peace agreements were entered into and honoured.[37]

Muslims also write what may be called apologia about jihad. For instance, Mahmoud (Maḥmūd) Shaltūt (1893–1963), the rector of Al-Azhar, tried to prove that the early wars of Islam were basically defensive as the small Muslim community was transgressed against.[38] Another collection of articles emphasising peace and interpreting the apparently aggressive verses differently is *War and Peace in Islam*.[39] In Pakistan there are very few such studies by academics trained on Western lines—Iftikhar Malik's introduction to jihad being one of them—but there are some by traditionally-trained Islamic scholars ('ulamā): Mawdūdī, Ghulām Aḥmad Parwēz (1903–1985), Mawlānā Waḥīduddīn Khān (b. 1925), to name a few.[40] One study in particular needs to be highlighted. It is a monograph by 'Ammār Khān Nāṣir (b. 1975), a contemporary Pakistani scholar of Islam, who argues that: (a) the classical jurists considered jihad a part of 'doing good and stopping evil' (*al-amr bi 'l mā'rūf wa 'l nahī 'an al-munkar*). The aim was to invite people to Islam and, if they do not accept the faith, to fight and subjugate them; (b) modernist scholars have interpreted jihad as merely a defensive war necessitated by the aggression directed by the Arab polytheists towards the early Muslim community; (c) the conquests of foreign lands was not meant to go on but was restricted to the Persian Empire and parts of the Byzantine Empire. Indeed, Muslims were supposed to avoid fighting the Turks and the Africans. For (a), the author presents opinions, both for and against, from the classical and later sources. The majority opinion seems to be that this order was only for the Arab polytheists and applied to no other group. However, he does criticise opinions previously held on issues related to such a reading which will be examined in the relevant chapters.[41]

In short, interpretations of jihad range between the desire to live in peace and harmony with the world as well as perpetual strife. The latter can act as the spark which sends young men to missions of death and destruction in the contemporary world. This, ironically, is the kind of action which makes headlines though there are others which, by their very nature of seeking peace, remain unnoticed. Hence, it is necessary to understand how jihad has been interpreted in the modern world. This study, however, confines itself only to South Asia.

The most relevant study for this book is the American academic Asma Afsaruddin's book, *Striving in the Path of God*, appropriately sub-titled 'Jihād and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought'.[42] Afsaruddin's study tries to understand the changing meanings of jihad through the medieval exegeses

of the Qur'an, the hadith, and studies on the subject. She concludes, after an impressive study of the original sources, that the literature about jihad suggests that it has been variously interpreted and that political circumstances—ongoing battles against the Iranian and Byzantine Empires followed by the crusades—privileged the combative aspects over other connotations. She also refutes the militant interpretations of present-day Islamist radical theoreticians who construe jihad as permanent war against non-Muslims as well as secular Muslim rulers. Her conclusion is that the Qur'an 'advocates only limited, defensive fighting when peaceful overtures and stoic, non-violent resistance have failed and the adversary attacks first. The religious affiliation of the adversary in itself is irrelevant.'[43] The fact that her book is an intellectual history of the evolution of the idea of jihad makes it a model to be followed in the present study.

Scholars of South Asia have, however, written about manifestations of movements which call themselves jihad in their part of the world. Perhaps the work which will appear at first sight to be very close to the present author's endeavour is the Pakistani-American historian Ayesha Jalal's book, *Partisans of Allah*.[44] It starts with the following objective:

> This book ... focuses on the development of the idea and practice of Jihad over several centuries and across the space that connects West Asia to South Asia.[45]

This is very close to the objective of providing a history of the idea of jihad in South Asia in this book. However, there are so many differences in the way Jalal has argued her case and the way it has been done in the following pages that these are two very different projects.

First, Jalal has given her preferred interpretation of jihad in the beginning of the book and comes back to it in the end. She says that 'the Qur'an does not lend itself well to the notion of jihad as holy war, and far less to the idea of continuous warfare against infidels, how did this discrepancy between the text and the later, legally based interpretations of the concept arise?'[46] This study, on the other hand, studies the way scholars of Islam give interpretations of jihad without attempting to start with one. Second, Jalal has not given any account of the hermeneutical devices used to interpret the Qur'an and the hadith which is the main focus of this study. Thirdly, while Jalal has looked at the history of the concept of jihad in the works of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817–1898), Chirāgh 'Alī (1844–1895), Abū'l Kalām Āzād (1888–1958), Mawdūdī,

Ḥāfiẓ Sa'īd (spelled as Hafiz Saeed in English sources) (b. 1948), and so on with reference to sources other than exegeses, this study gives primary importance to Qur'anic exegeses by these writers. However, Jalal's work is valuable and its historical narrative about events understood as jihad leaves little room for duplication in that direction. Thus, chronological description of such events is reduced to a minimum and often relegated to notes so as to avoid duplicating her work and other similar studies.

Another study which partly overlaps with this one, is Samina Yasmeen's *Jihad and Dawah*.[47] The author carries out a longitudinal analysis of the narratives of Lashkar-e-Tayyabah and Jamat ud Dawah, both under the general leadership and guidance of Ḥāfiẓ Sa'īd, who has interpreted verses of the Qur'an in order to inspire Pakistanis to fight India for Kashmir. Yasmeen has analysed not only Sa'īd's *Tafsīr Sūrah Tawbah*, which has also been done in this book (chapter 9), but also other narratives: pamphlets, magazines, messages, etc. Among other things she points out how narratives evolve in response to historical, social, and other pressures and how they are used to promote jihad. Despite the overlap with a part of one chapter, Yasmeen's work is very different from this study. First, it pays close attention to the printed works of Ḥāfiẓ Sa'īd's organisations, but does not touch upon those by other Pakistani Islamists. Secondly, it tells us how these narratives evolve from promoting jihad to creating a wider space in Pakistani society by emphasizing patience (ṣabr), social service, and piety under international and domestic pressures. The present study, however, mostly analyses Ḥāfiẓ Sa'īd's exegeses with a view to finding out as to what hermeneutical devices he uses to arrive at militant meanings of verses. Lastly, Yasmeen's work is a study of narratives and their role in society whereas this book is a history of the idea of jihad for the last 300 years with focus on the Qur'anic exegeses though not to the exclusion of other interpretations of the concept of jihad in South Asia.

Likewise Christine Fair's book, sub-titled *Understanding the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba*[48] is what it says—a history of Ḥāfiẓ Sa'īd's organisation with a view to proving that it is supported by the ISI to inflict such punishment on India as would bring it to negotiate on Kashmir. Its title, *In Their Own Words*, refers to some of the publications of Ḥāfiẓ Sa'īd's organisations—books or pamphlets rather than the magazines and other works used by Yasmeen—which refer to reasons for fighting in Kashmir and the imperative not to fight the Pakistani state nor to declare Muslims as heretics (takfīr). Fair does not refer to the exegeses of Sa'īd or Mas'ūd Azhar (spelled as Masood Azhar in the literature) (b. 1968), the head of the UN-designated terrorist group Jaish-e-Muhammad, which are

important concerns of the present study. While the archive which Christine Fair has assembled for this study, especially the biographies of LeT/JUD fighters, is impressive, her tone towards Pakistan is acerbic rather than neutral and the last chapter, contemplating the punishment to be given to Pakistan for using non-state actors in Kashmir (even hinting at nuclear war), is disturbing for anyone who desires peace in South Asia.

Yet another study of some of the narratives of the Taliban, especially relevant for Pakistan and Afghanistan, is a Pakistani academic Afzal Khan's doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Erfurt in 2016. Khan chooses three texts: Mawdūdī's *Al-jihād fī al-Islām*; Nūr (spelled Noor) Muḥammad's *Jihād-i afghānistān*, and Faḍal Muḥammad Yusufzaī's *Dā'wat-i jihād* for analysis. He argues that Mawdūdī places jihad in the tradition of 'commanding right and forbidding wrong' (*al-amr bi 'l mā'rūf wa 'l nahī 'an al-munkar*). This is explained by Nūr Muḥammad Yusufzaī in moral terms of right and wrong so that, in the words of Afzal Khan, the moral vision of the Taliban is a kind of 'man standing-guard-over-the-morals' but the tactics to achieve this became anarchic. Afzal Khan's approach is philosophical and he uses lexicology and 'anthropology'—basically interviewing and observation—in his research. His work does not overlap with the concerns of this study though it offers some useful insights into the phenomenon of jihad.[49] Another recent book-length work, Tariq Hasan's *Colonialism and the Call to Jihād in British India*,[50] purporting to cover some of the areas already covered by Jalal, is based on selective secondary sources and is mostly tendentious and journalistic.

Apart from these studies of jihad movements in South Asia as a whole, there are also scholarly studies of iconic militant (*jihādī*) figures. Foremost among them is Sayyid Aḥmad Barēlwī (i.e., of the city of Rae Bareilly. The name is also written as Barelvi) (1786–1831). Though much has been written about him in the hagiographic mode, there was a lack of objective and rigorous writing.[51] This gap has been filled by Altaf Qadir, a Pakistani academic, who looks at this movement from the point of view of the local people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and provides a detailed and accurate sketch of events.[52] Among the most notable of the scholarly studies on the religious figures of KP—the *mullāhs, faqīrs*, and others—who used the concept of jihad to evoke hostility among the tribesmen against the British, is a book by Sana Haroon.[53] Studies on iconic figures such as Ubaydullah Sindhī (1872–1944), the Faqīr of Ipī (1897–1960),[54] the Ḥājjī of Turangzaī (1858–1937),[55] and others also deserve attention. Although the aim of this study is not to describe the causes or the historical events

which go by the name of jihad, they will, nevertheless, be inevitably sketched out in order to understand how the concept itself was interpreted.

Having said that, the idea and practice of interpretation is so central to this book that it has been given a separate chapter to itself which focuses on the hermeneutics of the canonical sources of Islam—the Qur'an and the hadith. However, since the book is sub-titled *An Intellectual History*, this latter concept may be explained here. This is meant to distinguish this study from theology and place it within the discipline of the history of ideas.[56] Whereas a theologian is expected to give an essentially theological interpretation of what jihad is, a historian of this idea may trace out what theologians and other intellectuals have said about it and place it in the context of such larger intellectual frameworks as the impact of modernity, the interaction of political forces, and cultural trends. Such a history deals with the formation of an idea and its evolution over time and relates it to the forces which play upon it to give it the meanings and implications it imbibes over time.

Such a history has its own problems. First, as an author of an intellectual history of Islam in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb points out, it 'has itself been under something of a cloud in recent years' because of the impression that it focuses 'on the intellectual elite' and does not take cognizance of 'social and political realities'.[57] Secondly, as Quentin Skinner has pointed out, its very source material—written texts—needs to be interpreted which is by no means a transparent undertaking. As the next chapter will focus in more detail on what Skinner has written about—that texts are interpreted with reference to both the intention to be understood and 'the intention that this intention be understood'—we need not go into detail about this process here.[58]

Thus, the history of ideas as they occur in texts is the history of what they were meant to communicate to audiences which were themselves products of historical forces. It may be, as Skinner warns us, that the history of thought cannot solve our immediate problems,[59] but it can help us in understanding how a term is interpreted and what practical effects this can have on the world. Thus, our different understandings of jihad can help explain the forces which drive human beings into adopting courses of action (such as suicide bombing) which appear inexplicable to observers outside of those webs of meanings.

Generally, the sub-genre of the history of ideas is used for the history of philosophical and scientific ideas—the idea of zero, the idea of numbers, the idea of democracy, the idea of freedom, etc. There are also books like Mikkel Thorup's *An Intellectual History of Terror*[60] which is

relevant for the theme of this study. Thorup calls his work as 'the first attempt at an *intellectual history* of terror, or rather of our legitimizations and delegitimizations of political violence' carried out by the state (emphasis in the original).[61] He uses ideas such as Michel Foucault's 'genealogical history', Quentin Skinner's 'intellectual history', and Reinhart Koselleck's 'conceptual history' in order to understand how ideas which legitimise certain forms of political violence evolve.[62] Similarly, there is an intellectual study of the idea of gratitude. The author contends that his study 'is a history of *persons* responding to social and political circumstances with the intellectual resources at their disposal.'[63]

In the field of Islamic studies, much has been written on the history of thought, so much so that making a list of important works alone will require volumes. There is, for example, Montgomery Watt's history of the formative period of Islamic thought.[64] Daniel Brown's *Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought*[65] is another example. It is a history of the idea of Prophetic authority (*sunnāh* and hadith) in modern Muslim societies. Brown defines it as a 'history of ideas' and places it in the tradition of 'intellectual history' on the grounds that his focus is the 'current of thought that would seem to be new, innovative, holding promise for change'. To do this, he argues, one can 'emphasize individuals, trends, or schools of thought'. He chooses the second alternative since he is concerned 'with the influence of ideas and not just with the ideas themselves'.[66] And, finally, one may look as an example of a paradigmatic work in this field at Qasim Zaman's book called *Islamic Thought in a Radical Age*.[67] The book raises important points such as the intellectual history of internal criticism in the Islamic tradition and how, with the dilution of traditional authority, the Islamists 'share much with the modernists in their intellectual backgrounds and the novelty of many of the positions they advocate'.[68] This is an important point, touching as it does on the question of the dispersal of authority in modern Islam which is relevant for understanding which activities are called jihad, how they are justified, and by whom—questions which constitute important parts of the present study.

This does not mean that the present work gets reduced to a history of people; even their intellectual beings. Rather, it focuses on the idea of jihad as interpreted by people in order to understand how the idea has evolved in South Asia. The idea is an important one as it affected society, creating anti-colonial aspirations using the idiom of jihad, militant movements, and, in the contemporary context, Islamist militancy. As Fazlur Rahman noted, 'the Islamic concept of Jihad was heavily relied upon to arouse

the sentiments of the general public against foreign rulers.'[69] But, as we shall see, it could also be used to suppress dissent, create a theocracy, and augment the power of its practitioners.

This study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What are the major interpretations of jihad in the colonial and contemporary periods in South Asia?
2. In what ways have the concepts of jihad and terms associated with it (Islamic state, *Dārul Ḥarb* (land of war), *Dārul Islām* (land of peace), *fitnah* (evil, persecution, oppression), *fasād* (disorder, mischief), *tāghūt* (forces or systems rebelling against God; idol; evil forces), *jizyah* (poll-tax), etc.) been used by exegetes in particular and others in general to pursue their ideological, political, and other objectives?
3. In what way are the traditional Sunni notions of jihad different from those of the modernists (apologists, progressives) as well as radical Islamists?
4. And, finally, what interpretations of jihad are appealed to by the theoreticians of militant movements (especially the Al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban including the Punjabi Islamist militant groups)? This final question, in fact, is the *raison d'être* of this study.

If militant interpretations have been influenced, partly or fully, by the modern theoreticians of Islamist militancy—Ḥassan al-Bannāh (1906–1949), Mawdūdī, Quṭb, 'Abdullāh Azzām, Muḥammad 'Abd al-Salām Farāj (1954–1982), Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī (b. 1951), etc.—how have they justified militancy? The answers to these questions constitute an intellectual history of the way the concept of jihad has been interpreted in South Asia and elsewhere.

But before answering these questions it should be remembered that in some ways present-day Islamic militancy has precedents in history. These were the wars of the Kharijites, whose ideas as well as practices have been described by scholars,[70] and whose history is given by the famous historian, exegete, and scholar Abū Jā'far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (224/839–310/923).[71] The other precedent which comes to the mind is the assassination of establishment figures during Abbasid rule carried out by the followers of Ḥasan ibn Sabbāh (1050s–1154), to which the Persian historian 'Ala al-Dīn 'Aṭā Allāh Malik Juwainī (1226–1283) bears witness[72] and which has been discussed by contemporary scholars.[73] Since there are some parallels between these militant phenomena and

present-day events in the Muslim world, these will be touched upon briefly. However, the contemporary militant movements called jihad are a modern phenomena created, in great part, by the reaction to modernity in general and the international situation in the world as perceived by many Muslims in particular. This is true in the obvious sense that modern conditions—rapid change, dislocation, access to news sharpening grievances against the USA and Israel, a sense of community created by the idiom of a Muslim group spread internationally, the use of technology—did not exist earlier. But whether it is also true in the deeper philosophical sense of reacting to modernity with its grand narratives and a sense of the triumphant, rational West is yet to be established. Similarly, it is also questionable whether the doubt created by post-modern ways of thinking and the fragmentation of the self can be used to explain conservative, Wahhābī and Islamist interpretations as the quest for certainties. It is best that the theory should emerge out of the evidence and not vice versa. Yet, it is tempting to give a brief account of modernity since we will refer to it frequently.

Modernity as a way of thinking entails faith in reason, emphasis upon the natural with epistemology based upon empiricism, belief in progress, and rejection of authority (religious, social, ancestral, etc.). It has been associated with rapid social change involving the use of Western categories of thinking, categorisation and behaviour in non-Western countries especially those which experienced colonisation.[74] It is argued that, instead of modernity, the concept of multiple modernities should be used as it allows us to move away from 'the homogenic and hegemonic vision of modernity imagined in the 1950s'.[75] This is a useful insight only in so far as it is not allowed to relativise the concept of modernity till it loses its value as an analytical concept. Thus, one could concede that the modernities of Britain as well as India were influenced by each other.[76] However, when Appadurai and Brekenridge contend that Indian modernity is 'as varied as magic, marriage, or madness', they are manifestly wrong.[77] At the most we can talk of a 'fractured modernity' in India as Sanjay Joshi does in his study of the making of the middle class in north India (Lucknow).[78] This means that some pre-modern elements—Joshi's example is hierarchy masquerading as education—might mix in with modernity. However, when Partha Chatterjee says that our modernity 'is the modernity of the once-colonized',[79] this only explains the ambivalence many South Asians have for Western values, artefacts, institutions, and attitudes. This can explain why Islamists can accept gadgets which empower them: machines, computers, weapons, and means of communication and travel etc., while hating the freedom of

people to date each other or, for women, to wear revealing clothes. But, unless we are talking of the ideological change, the worldview, the belief-system, we are not talking of people who have converted to modernity. I would contend that, despite being different in certain peripheral ways, modernity is ontologically the same all over the world. And one of its core values, as Talal Asad (b. 1932) concedes but critiques, is the privatisation of religion.[80] So, modern India and (to a lesser degree) Pakistan, at least in their constitutions, uphold this core value and appeal to rationality in their education systems. Of course, the political promise is often compromised and informal education still emphasises the magical—modernity is fractured and mistrusted—but where it exists as an aspiration or in partial reality, it is essentially different from movements militating against it.

Among the movements which militate against it and react to it are those which fall back upon things to which they ascribe iconic value to mark their 'differences' from what they see as the homogenising Western imposition of modernity. As Talal Asad argues, there is no escaping the intellectual, aesthetic, and cultural domination of secularism which is the by-product of modernity (the same would be true if religion were dominant in a society).[81] Thus, the argument is that people assert their difference through the symbol of religion. However, it is simplistic to accept the secularisation thesis—modernity having secularised the West *in toto* while South Asia remains 'spiritual'—as Peter van der Veer reminds us. Indeed, modernity also produced evangelical movements in England as it did what Kenneth Jones calls 'socio-religious reform movements' in South Asia.[82] In South Asia, at least, the resurgence of high Islam, as well as other religions, such as Sikhism and Hinduism, suggests that the classical claim of early modernity that the process entails secularisation as it did in Western societies needs rethinking.[83] According to Khalid Masud (b. 1939), a Pakistani scholar of Islam, 'Muslim modern trends range from reform to total rejection of either tradition or modernity'.[84] The 'Western modernists' reject the Islamic tradition while the 'Islamic modernists' range from calling for revivalism to reinterpreting Islam so that it conforms to certain humanist values.[85] In a sense, fundamentalism, Islamist radicalism, and militancy too are reactions to the totalising experience of modernity but are not a form of modernity themselves—unless one wants to adjectivise everything as modern. Their major claim is to reject the ideology of modernity in order to go back to classical Islam. However, the cultural and religious authenticity they marshal in defence of their ideologies is not really of the classical period of Islam at all. It is a contemporary construction of their idealised understanding of it.

Another reaction to modernity is acceptance of some of its core values, the values of the Enlightenment (rationalism, egalitarianism, human rights, women's rights, democracy, etc.). Those modernist Muslim thinkers who do so are then faced with the problem of reconciling them with Islam. This, of course, is done through interpreting the foundational texts in ingenious ways. In short, as Qasim Zaman, in his seminal study of the traditional *'ulamā* in South Asia, has pointed out, both these trends—modernism and Islamist radicalism—'have been largely rooted in modern, Westernized institutions of education'.[86]

In the case of Muslims who develop group-consciousness, the assertion of an identity is a survival tool against perceived grievances or ideological conquest by 'the West'. Thus, the Muslim diaspora in Western countries as well as self-defining groups (sects, sub-sects, ideologically oriented groups) constitute the imagined community—to use Anderson's idiom,[87] which perceives and confronts other equally imagined groups based upon constructed identities. As these constructions, perceptions, and definitions are based upon interpretations of Islam—in this case the crucial concept of jihad—it would be helpful to understand how South Asian interpreters of this concept have understood it.

This brings us to the question of methodology used for analysing the interpretations relevant for our purposes. Primarily, the Qur'anic verses used by traditional interpreters, modernists, and radical Islamists in Urdu exegeses (except for Sayyid Qutb's exegesis which has been used in the English translation) to justify their understanding of jihad will be studied. These are:

Table 1.1: The Verses of the Qur'an

Al Baqarah	2:190	Repel aggression but in proportion to the offence.
	2:191	Fight those who began hostilities since *fitnah* is worse than war.
	2:193	Fight to end *fitnah* till religion is purely for God.
Al-Anfāl	8:39	Fight till *fitnah* disappears and religion is only for God.
	8:61	If the enemy inclines towards peace so should you.
Al-Tawbah	9:5	Kill the polytheists wherever you find them (sword verse).
	9:29	Fight the people of the Book till they are subdued and pay the poll tax (*jizyah*) as 'small ones' (*sāghirūn*) (*jizyah* verse).
Al-Mumtahinah	60:8	You may be kind and just to those who have not been hostile to you (for full texts see Annexure B).

While the first verse seems to allow only defensive warfare and that too in proportion to the injury, the three subsequent ones mention a concept called *fitnah*, translated either as persecution or disbelief, which determines the implications of these verses. Two verses, 8:61 and 60:8, advocate peaceful and amicable coexistence with non-Muslims both as groups in society and as nation-states. However, two verses, 9:5 and 29, used very often by Islamist militants to justify their project of eternal warfare with the rest of the world, apparently allow perpetual warfare. Indeed, Osama bin Laden quoted 9:5 in his *fatwā* against Americans, adding to it:

> Our youths know that the humiliation suffered by Muslims as a result of the occupation of their sanctuaries cannot be removed except by explosions and jihad.[88]

In short, taken at their face value there are verses which imply fighting as well as living in peace. The point is how they are interpreted and which interpretation is privileged by those in power. For instance, the above verse, as interpreted by Afifi al-Akiti, a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, is not about perpetual war at all. It was, he says, about the Arab polytheists who had broken the treaty of Hudaybiyyah and its order is subject 'to specification' (*takhṣīṣ*) and is not general (*'ām*).[89] Indeed, it is their interpretations which distinguishes the traditionalist, modernist-progressive, and radical-militants from each other in South Asia and, indeed, in the rest of the world. Thus, the interpretation of these eight verses by the most significant exegetes of South Asia studied in this book will be discussed in relation to the politics and dominant ideologies of the periods of their writing.

While the focus of this book is on the way the concept of jihad is interpreted in the Urdu-using part of South Asia from the eighteenth century onwards, there will inevitably be some references to jihadi movements in India especially during the colonial era and then again in the contemporary period. In this context, the use of Habermas's concept of 'public sphere' by Deitrich Reetz may be useful. Reetz argues that his study of Islamic groups in India from 1900 to 1947 analyses religious discourse on the assumption that it negotiates 'the hierarchy of values and activist concepts in competition and comparison with other Islamic or religious groups'.[90] In this study then we will analyse one variant of this discourse: that relating to jihad.

The sources of this book are mostly in Urdu and English; not in Arabic. These sources are mostly the various exegeses or commentaries of the Qur'an from the eighteenth century onwards. Only one early exegesis, that by the famous Islamic scholar of the eighteenth century Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz (1746–1824), is in Persian, but this too is available in the Urdu translation.[91] In any case this exegesis does not cover the verses about jihad or, indeed, those given in Table 1.1. Most of the South Asian Islamic scholars—Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817–1898), 'Ubaydullāh Sindhī, Mawdūdī, Abū'l Kalām Āzād (1888–1958), Ghulām Aḥmad Parwēz, Waḥiduddīn Khān, Ḥāfiẓ Saʿīd, Masʿūd Aẓhar—whose works have been used as primary sources to understand how jihad has been interpreted wrote in Urdu. The works of Arab theoreticians such as Sayyid Quṭb, Farrāj, 'Abdullah 'Azzām, and Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī, are originally in Arabic, but their English or Urdu translations are available and have been used for this study. Besides the exegeses there are other works—essays, sermons, pamphlets, and books—on jihad by South Asian writers in Urdu or English which have also been consulted. As the author is well versed in both Urdu and English, can read Persian with some understanding, and also knows basic Arabic, this study does not suffer from linguistic impediments. It needs to be reiterated that the author does not claim to be trained in either theology or Islamic jurisprudence. Thus, if some readers are looking for a final theological interpretation of jihad by the author, they will be disappointed. In any case, even if such an interpretation had been offered, it would have been no more than yet *another*, rather than the *only*, interpretation. Indeed, the point of this study is that there are more than one interpretation of ideas; that all interpretations are subject to change because of external dominant discourses, and, hence, there is no fixed, unchanging intellectual monolith called jihad.

While it is conceded that people do not fight only because they are inspired by theory—indeed they fight for various complicated reasons—this is no reason for not trying to understand the history of such theories which do, after all, acquire a niche in the worldview of so many people. A book on intellectual history can put together a historical narrative of an idea to which people ostensibly refer in order to justify their actions without going into the question of their deeper, covert psychological motivations.

After this introductory chapter there are ten other chapters including the conclusion. Chapter 2 is on the interpretation of the Qur'an and the hadith. It gives a brief outline of the interpretative devices used by exegetes in explaining the meanings of these canonical sources. These

devices may be used to give a meaning of jihad which promotes either war or peace. Chapter 3 is on 'Jihad in Transition'. It gives a synoptic account of the political uses of jihad by some of the medieval Muslim rulers of India. More importantly, it examines the state of Islamic learning in India during this period of transition to modernity with a view to understanding how jihad was constructed in the available texts of the period. Chapter 4, entitled 'Jihad and The Family of Shāh Walīullah', begins with the legacy of the great Islamic scholar, Shāh Walīullah (1703–1762), pertaining to events which went by the name of jihad in India. In this context, his son Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz's edicts (fatāwā) on the question of India's Islamic status—whether it is a land of peace or Islam (Dārul Islām) or a land of war (Dārul Ḥarb) or something in between—is most important since it influenced Muslim politics in India for more than a century. One of the persons influenced by 'Azīz who actually led a jihad movement in the present-day KP province of Pakistan was Sayyid Aḥmad Barēlwī. His influence over a number of resistance movements during colonial rule will be touched upon in passing. Chapter 5, on 'Colonial Modernists', is on the modernist interpreters of Islam in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries—Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Chirāgh 'Alī,[92] Syed Ameer Ali (1849–1928), etc.—who wrote to counter the colonial view that Islam was an aggressive religion and preached violence. Some of their ideas are still used by modernist Muslims in South Asia to defend Islam against the same charges now levelled both by Western scholars and militant Islamists. Chapter 6, entitled 'Jihad as Anti-colonial Resistance', looks at the ideas of 'Ubaydullāh Sindhī, some prominent members of the Deobandi clergy, and Abū'l Kalām Āzād. It covers responses ranging from covert attempts at armed resistance to the British to agitational, nationalist politics. Chapter 7, entitled 'The Age of Mawdūdī', describes his ideas of Muslim political dominance, the Islamic state, and jihad as an instrument of power. Mawdūdī's writings on these subjects, with special focus on his exegesis of the Qur'an, will be discussed. Chapter 8, called 'Radical Imports', provides the link with Islamist militant ideas from the Middle East which establish much of the theoretical basis of the forms of international militancy which is the focus of this book. This chapter will look at the interpretations of jihad by Quṭb, Farrāj, 'Azzām, and Ẓawāhirī. The ideas of these writers, though not the primary focus of this study, will be examined briefly in order to understand their influence on Pakistani militants. Chapter 9 is on Pakistani radical interpreters of jihad—Ḥāfiẓ Saʿīd,[93] Masʿūd Aẓhar,[94] Muftī Shamazaī,[95] and others—who have written much on the subject of jihad and inspired young men to fight in Kashmir

and Afghanistan. Chapter 10, entitled 'Refuting the Radicals', is about the edicts and interpretations offered by present-day South Asian (and other) writers against the views of the Islamist militants. This is an important chapter since, like the modernists, the aim of these writers is to counter the militant view that jihad can be fought by non-state actors without any permission of the government and that it is justified to fight non-Muslim and even Muslim rulers whether there are treaties with the former or not. The last chapter is the 'Conclusion' in which the whole argument of the book will be summed up. One important question discussed here will be as to which interpretative devices are used to give an aggressive or peaceful reading of verses from the canonical sources.

The book has a bibliography divided into sections. The first section is on the original sources (exegeses, translations of the Qur'an, edicts, and manuscript sources, etc.); the second is on secondary sources in English, Urdu, and other languages. This is followed by annexures of the Qur'anic verses and *aḥādīth* which makes for convenient reading. In the end there is an index to facilitate researchers.

NOTES

1. Volpi 2011a, 1.
2. The following categorisation of Muslim ideological groups is based on a number of sources. William E. Shepard, in his note 1 to his article on 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology' (1987) gives a review of scholarly efforts to identify Weberian 'ideal types' or analytical constructs in order to discuss ideological orientations among Muslims. He himself uses the terms secularism, Islamic modernism, radical modernism, traditionalism, and neo-traditionalism. The first three are 'very high on the scale of "modernity"' and the last two 'vary from them primarily on the scale of "modernity"' (Shepard 1987, 307). Contemporary intellectual successors of classical modernists but different from them are Progressive Muslims who use a 'systematic, thematicoholistic and corroborative, inductive approach to interpretation of Qur'anic content' (Duderija 2011, 148). Still another term used for such interpreters of Islam is Neo-traditional Salafism (NTS) (Duderija 2011, 47). Islamism is a term coined by political scientists for those who use the Islamic idiom to gain political power.
3. Denoeux 2011, 70.
4. Ibid., 60.
5. Afsaruddin 2013, 34.
6. Landa-Tassecron 2003, 38.
7. Ibid., 35.
8. Ibid., 36.
9. Rahman, F 1980, 110.
10. Bonner 2006, 2.
11. Crone 2004, 363.
12. These categories are flexible and other scholars might change them. Moreover, the category 'orders' are not only about fighting but also refer to other instructions

regarding the conduct of war and peace. These categories are different from Rosalind Ward Gwynne's thirty forms of reasoning which she subsumes under ten broad categories: commands, rules, legal arguments, comparisons, contrasts, categorical syllogisms, conditional syllogisms, and disjunctive syllogism (Gwynne 2016).
13. Ṭabarī c. 10 C a.
14. Sulamī c. 12 C in Christie 2015.
15. Bonner 2006; Bonney 2004; Firestone 1999; Lewis 2003; Cook 2005; Crone 2004; Kepel 2000; Roy 1999; Kelsay 2007.
16. Bonney 2004.
17. Firestone 1999.
18. Lewis 2003, 102.
19. Cook 2005, 30.
20. Crone 2004, 362.
21. Ibid., 369.
22. Ibid., 372.
23. Ibid., 367.
24. Kepel 2000.
25. Roy 1999, ix.
26. Bergen 2001, 2006; Burke 2003; Devji 2005.
27. Burke 2003.
28. Ibid., 298.
29. Ibid., 169–70.
30. Ibid., 289.
31. Kelsay 2007.
32. Ibid., 142–144.
33. Qaraḍāwī 2009.
34. Jackson 2015, 312–333.
35. Zaman 2012, 265.
36. Khaddūrī 1955. Quoted from Bostom 2005, 309.
37. Ibid., 311.
38. Shaltūt 1948.
39. Muhammad et al., 2013.
40. Iftikhar Malik provides an introduction to the concept of jihad linking it to the Taliban movement (2005, 40–82). For studies by religious scholars, see Mawdūdī 1930, *Matālib* 1975–1991, Khān, W *Tazkīr* 1985.
41. Nāṣir 2012, 111–300.
42. Afsaruddin 2013.
43. Ibid., 297.
44. Jalal 2008.
45. Ibid., 6.
46. Ibid., 7.
47. Yasmeen 2017.
48. Fair. Forthcoming.
49. Khan, A 2016.
50. Hasan 2015.
51. Khan n.d., Mahar 1952, Nadwī, A 1939 & 1969.
52. Qadir 2015.
53. Haroon 2007.
54. Shaikh 1986; Laghari 1980; Warren 2000; Hauner 1981.
55. Qadir 2006, 2008.

56. Kelly 2002.
57. El-Rouayheb 2015, 3.
58. Skinner 1969, 48.
59. Ibid., 53.
60. Thorup 2010.
61. Ibid., 4.
62. Ibid., 5. See also Koselleck 2002.
63. Leithart 2014, 3.
64. Watt 2006.
65. Brown 1996.
66. Ibid., 4.
67. Zaman 2012.
68. Ibid., 2.
69. Rahman 1982, 55.
70. Salem 1956, Crone and Zimmermann 2001, Kenny 2006.
71. The Kharijites was a group which separated from the caliph 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (23/600–40/661) when he was forced to agree to arbitration with Mu'āwiyyah after the battle of Siffīn (Ṭabarī c. 10 C b. Vol. 3, 288–391). The Kharijites often fought with desperate courage risking life and limb in their wars against the Umayyads and the Abbasids. This could be equated with suicide attacks which is a battle tactic used by modern-day militants. The original sources (such as Ṭabarī) describe a number of practices of the Kharijites which parallel those of the present-day Islamist militants (Taliban, al-Qaeda, IS, Boko Haram, etc.). First, both believe in *takfīr*, i.e. they excommunicate other Muslims and permit their assassination by non-state actors, the confiscation of their property and the enslavement of their women and children. Secondly, they believe it is permissible to revolt against Muslim rulers on the grounds that they do not govern according to the *Sharī'ah* or do not practise Islam in their personal lives. Thirdly, they believe that it is necessary to use force to create an Islamic state which will ensure that governance is carried out according to God's laws. Other parallels, such as the cruel methods of execution and the killing of women and children, are also pointed out.
72. Boyle 1958.
73. Hodgson 1955; Daftary 1994. The nearest parallel to the suicide attacks used by radical militants and called 'attacks of self-sacrificers' (*fidāyīn*) are similar attacks by the followers of Ḥasan ibn Sabbāh, the pioneer of the Isma'īlī Nizārī sect (*al Nizāriyyūn*), who established himself in a castle at Alamut and sent young men (known in Western sources as the Assassins) to kill individual functionaries of the establishment at the cost of their own lives. Juvainī, a contemporary historian, describes how rulers were assassinated and received threats. For instance, Ibn Sabbāh got a dagger planted near Sultān Sanjar's bed and the Sultan 'took fright and from then on inclined towards peace' with the Assassins. Another ruler, Al-Rāshid Billah reached Isfahan while sick and 'suddenly some vile fida'is entered his audience-chamber and stabbed him to death' (Juvainī in Boyle 1958, 682 and 686). Thus, it appeared as if nobody was safe. The fear this induced is familiar in today's world where terrorists can strike almost anywhere.
74. For a history see Bayly 2004.
75. Eisenstadt 1999, 294; also see Eisenstadt 2000.
76. Veer 2001; Therborn 2003.
77. Brekenridge and Appadurai 1996, 1.
78. Joshi 2001.

79. Chatterjee 1997, 20.
80. Asad 2003.
81. Ibid.
82. Veer 2001; Jones 1994.
83. Hefner 1998; Jones 1994.
84. Masud 2016, 237.
85. Ibid., 238.
86. Zaman 2002, 7.
87. Anderson 1983.
88. Euben and Zaman 2009, 456.
89. Akiti, al- 2005, 31.
90. Reetz 2006, 4.
91. *Tafsīr-e-'Azīzī*.
92. Ali 1885.
93. Sa'īd *Tawbah*.
94. Azhar *Fath*.
95. Shamazaī 2012; 'Ābid 2003.